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ABSTRACT
Does Corruption Promote Emigration?
An Empirical Examination
This paper empirically investigates the relationship between corruption and the emigration of
those with high, medium and low levels of educational attainment. The empirical results
indicate that as corruption increases the emigration rate of those with high levels of
educational attainment also increases. The emigration rate of those with middle and low
levels of educational attainment, however, increases at initial levels of corruption and then
decreases beyond a certain point. Splitting the sample by income inequality suggests that
increased inequality reduces the ability to emigrate. The policy conclusion is, that
government actions should focus on controlling corruption, which in turn would lead to funds
being channeled more productively into education and also lead to a fall in inequality which
would reduce emigration.
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1. Introduction
Neo-classical migration theory views emigrants as individual, rational players who decide to
move on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation. This theory perceives migration as leading to
an optimal allocation of resources through which wages are equalised across countries due to
the movement of labour, from surplus to scarce countries. Structuralists critique the neoclassical theory stating that individuals do not have a free choice to move as they are
fundamentally constrained by structural forces or alternatively, are forced to move due to
economic and political reasons (de Haas 2007). Dependency theorists argue that migration is
not necessarily an overall beneficial process as it leads to an extraction of labour from the
periphery to core deepening the vicious cycle of poverty in the periphery and accelerating
growth of the core. There are however, a number of push and pull forces brought about by
demographic change, globalization, political conflict, institutions and climate change that
have increased migration pressures both within and across borders (de Haas, 2007) 1 .

In the present study, we focus on corruption as a push factor for labour emigration. The
existence of corruption could lower the returns to education slowing down the process of
economics growth acting as a push factor for out-migration (Dimant et al. 2013). In the
presence of corruption, jobs are not granted based upon merit but political connections. This
could lead to higher levels of unemployment and/or underemployment, lowering the returns
to the stock of human capital. Corruption has been also been found to change the size and
composition of public expenditure away from vital sectors such as health and education
(Mauro 1998, Wei 2001) toward sectors which involve greater secrecy and less transparency
such as defence. Gupta et al. (2002, 2000) argue that corruption affects the provision of
1

See de Haas (2007) for a survey of the literature. Much of the theoretical work on remittances has been
devoted to the primary motive of migrants to remit. Among the motives put forward are, altruism (Banerjee
1984), insurance (Rosenzweig, 1988), investment (Lucas and Stark 1985), inheritance (Hoddinott 1994), risk
diversification (Stark and Levhari 1982).
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health and education services, by increasing the cost and lowering the quality of these
services. Similarly, Kaufmann et al. (1999), show that corruption reduces life expectancy and
literacy, and increases infant mortality rates. Following from this, corruption can therefore,
lower the stock of human capital and reduce the returns to education by slowing down
growth, generate unemployment and/underemployment (or reduce labour force participation),
increase inequality and reduce welfare (Gould and Amaro-Reyes, 1983, Dimant et al. 2013)
acting as a push factor for labour migration.

The limited literature that exists on corruption and migration focuses on the impact of
corruption on skilled migration (Dimant et al. 2013, Ariu and Squicciarini 2013). The impact
of corruption on other migrant categories has been overlooked in the literature. Therefore, our
contribution to the literature is threefold: (1) Employing the panel dataset of Brücker et al.
(2013) for emigration, we hypothesise that corruption not only increases the emigration rate
of those with high levels of educational attainment, but also, those with medium and low
levels of educational attainment; (2) we also investigate, for the first time, potential nonlinearities in the relationship between corruption and emigration. This question has not been
addressed in the literature. Studies have found a non-linear relationship between corruption
and growth (Aidt 2003, Méndez and Sepúlveda 2006). However, we wish to understand if
corruption has the same effect on the emigration of those with different levels of educational
attainment; (3) we also for the first time, split the sample into two groups by country and
time: those with low levels of income inequality (below the mean Gini index in the sample)
and those with high levels of income inequality (above the mean Gini index in the sample), to
investigate if the effect of corruption on emigration is dependent on the level of income
inequality.
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The results suggest that corruption beyond a certain threshold level of corruption reduces the
emigration rates of those with medium and low levels of educational attainment. Results also
indicate that income inequality reduces the ability to emigrate. Results are tested for
robustness in a number of ways: additional control variables to capture a range of possible
influences on emigration, interaction terms, different estimation methods including fixed
effects estimation to account for country level time invariant unobservable influences on
emigration, system GMM and IV estimation to correct for any potential endogeneity bias.
Given the uncertainty and likely measurement errors in corruption, the robustness of the
results are tested using two different data sets on corruption: the Transparency International
(TI) and Kaufmann et al. (2012) data sets.

The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature. Section 3
presents the data and methodology. Section 4 evaluates the results and section 5 concludes.

2. Literature
Corruption is the result of poor institutions. Despite the large literature investigating the
relationship between institutions and corruption (Lederman et al. 2005, Méndez and
Sepúlveda 2006, Aidt 2009, Dreher et al. 2009, Meon and Weill 2009, among others), there is
a very limited literature which investigates the relationship between corruption and
emigration.

Lederman et al. (2005) investigating the role of political institutions in determining the
existence of corruption argue that parliamentary systems, higher levels of democracy,
political stability, and freedom of press are all associated with lower levels of corruption.

5

Examining the effect of corruption on growth under different political regimes, Méndez and
Sepúlveda (2006), find evidence of a non-monotonic relationship between corruption and
growth. They show that corruption promotes economic growth at low levels of incidence and
affects growth negatively at high levels of incidence. Aidt (2003), similarly argues that in
countries with well developed institutions, corruption has a significant negative impact on
growth, while in countries with poor institutions, corruption has no effect on growth. Dreher
et al. (2009) construct a model which captures the relationship between institutional quality,
the shadow economy and corruption. They show that an improvement in institutional quality
reduces the size of the shadow economy directly, and corruption both directly and indirectly2.
Meon and Weill (2009) on the contrary, show that the adverse effects of corruption are lower
in countries with less well developed institutions.

Studies on the relationship between emigration and source country institutions are undertaken
by Beine and Sekatt (2013) and Docquier et al. (2010). Beine and Sekatt (2013) dividing
emigration into two groups, total emigration and skilled emigration, conclude that total
emigration affects all institutions positively with the exception of voice and accountability.
Similarly, Docquier et al. (2010) examining the influence of emigration on source country
institutions, observe that brain drain has an ambiguous effect on institutions, while unskilled
emigration has a positive effect on institutions.

The literature which investigates the influence of corruption on emigration is sparse. Dimnat
et al. (2013) examining the influence of corruption on out-migration, by dividing migration
into two groups – skilled migration and average migration for a group of countries over the
1985 to 2000 period, show that
2

corruption acts as a push factor for out-migration,

See Schneider and Enste (2000) for a survey of the consequences of shadow economies.
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particularly skilled migration. They observe that corruption weakens the returns to education,
in particular, that of the skilled group. Ariu and Squicciarini (2013) investigating how
corruption affects the inflows and outflows of migration for a group of countries, show that
corruption is detrimental for both migrant inflows and outflows. They argue that corruption
leads to the emigration of highly skilled nationals, and reduces the immigration of foreign
workers, thus leading to a net shortage of high skilled workers. This effect has adverse effects
in the long run, as it leads to a continuous decline of a nation’s human capital stock.

The present study extends upon the existing literature by arguing that corruption not only
affects the migration decisions of those with high levels of educational attainment, but also
those with middle and low levels of educational attainment. Corruption can increase the
emigration rate of the tertiary qualified group due to high levels of human capital investment
and expectation of high skill premiums (Dimant et al. 2013). Additionally, if the inequality
generated by corruption leads to an increase in progressive tax rates, this could act as a
disincentive to those with higher educational qualifications (Dimnat et al. 2013). If jobs are
granted on the basis of political connections rather than merit, this could also de-motivate
those with high levels of educational attainment, encouraging them to emigrate to countries
that are less corrupt. Corruption however, may not only increase the emigration rates of those
with high levels of educational attainment, but also those with medium and low levels of
educational attainment. Higher levels of unemployment and inequality generated by
corruption can induce those with medium and low levels of educational attainment to
emigrate. Dincer et al. (2012) argue that individuals belonging to low income groups (low
levels of educational attainment) could pay a higher proportion of their income in the form of
bribe payments. Similarly, corruption can channel government expenditure away from the
provision of essential services such as education and health that benefit those with lower
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levels of educational attainment most. Therefore deteriorating living conditions could also
increase the emigration rates of those with medium and low levels of educational attainment.

Studies have indicated that the relation between corruption and growth may well be nonlinear (Méndez and Sepúlveda 2006, Aidt et al. 2008). Méndez and Sepúlveda (2006) argue
that the type of political regime is important for the relation between corruption and growth.
They find evidence in favour of a non-linear relationship between corruption and growth in
countries that are politically free, as opposed to those which are not. A growth maximizing
level of corruption is observed for countries which are politically free. Aidt (2003), also
investigating for threshold effects between corruption and growth, argues that corruption has
a significant negative impact on growth in countries with well developed institutions and no
effect on growth in countries with weak institutions. It is therefore not unreasonable to expect
corruption to have non-linear effects on emigration with emigration rates initially increasing
at low levels of corruption and then declining as corruption increases. If living conditions
continue to deteriorate as corruption increases, the increased inequality generated by
corruption can increase liquidity constraints, particularly among those with medium and low
levels of educational attainment, reducing their ability to emigrate3. Corruption can
additionally, by weakening the tax systems increase tax evasion. This reduces resources
available for social welfare spending (Gupta et al. 2002) which primarily benefit those from
the lower income groups, making it more difficult for them to emigrate. Therefore, as
corruption continues to increase, the emigration rates among those with low and medium
levels of educational attainment could decline.

3

See Mckenzie and Rapoport (2007) for non linear effects between wealth and emigration .
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Following from this, the three core hypotheses, we investigate are the following:
(1) If corruption in a country increases, the emigration rates of those with high
educational attainment increases, ceteris paribus;
(2) If corruption in a country increases, the emigration rate of those with middle and low
levels of educational attainment increases up to a certain threshold and then decreases.
(3) The ability of those with medium and low levels of educational attainment to emigrate
falls as inequality increases.

3. Description of the Data
Panel data covering the 1995-2010 period with observations corresponding to five year
intervals are used. Data on emigration rates by educational level are from Brücker et al.
(2013). This includes data for the emigration rate of men and women over 25 by three
educational levels, high, middle and low. Emigrants with upper-secondary education are
classified as middle, those with post-secondary education as high and those with less than
upper-secondary education (including lower-secondary, primary and no schooling) as low.

The main independent variable of interest, is corruption. Two measures of corruption are
used in the empirical study that follows. One is the corruption measure from Transparency
International (TI). Here the estimate of corruption ranges from 0 (totally corrupt) to 10 (not
corrupt). The other is the estimate of corruption from Kaufmann et al. (2012) which ranges
from approximately -2.5 (totally corrupt) to 2.5 (not corrupt). In order to simplify the
interpretation of empirical results the measures of corruption have been reversed so that 0
stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt on the TI measure. The Kaufmann et al. measure
has been rescaled so that 0 stands for not corrupt and +5 for totally corrupt to maintain
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consistency with the TI measure. Therefore, higher values on these two indices indicate
higher levels of corruption.

A number of other control variables are used in the empirical analysis. GDP per capita is used
to control for the level of development of a country. Mauro (1998) and Wei (2001) argue that
corruption changes the size and composition of public expenditure away from vital sectors
such as health and education. This could increase the emigration rate, in particular, that of the
group with low and medium levels of educational attainment. We incorporate government
expenditure devoted to education as a percentage of GDP to control for this. Evidence shows
that corruption can also increase unemployment and inequality thus reducing welfare (Gould
and Amaro-Reyes, 1983, Dimant et al. 2013), acting as a push factor for labour migration.
We control for inequality by using the Gini coefficient and for employment by using the
labour force participation rate. The literature also shows that institutions affect corruption
(Lederman et al. 2005) and also the rate of emigration (Borjas 1987). The polity index is used
to capture institutions (Docquier et al.2010). Table 1 provides summary statistics for the data
used in the empirical analysis.
[Table 1, about here]
We also include non-linear terms for corruption (Méndez and Sepúlveda 2006, Aidt 2003). A
preliminary inspection of scatter plots between the TI corruption index and emigration rates
indicate non-linearity in the relationship between corruption and emigration rates for those
with middle and low levels of educational attainment.

[Figures 1-3, about here]
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4. The Model and Estimation Methodology
The preliminary estimation is carried out using panel fixed effects. Both fixed and random
effects models were estimated. However, based on the results of the Hausman test, the fixed
effects model was found to be relatively more reliable. Therefore the paper reports results
only for panel fixed effect estimation. The fixed effects estimator permits controlling for any
unobserved country-specific time-invariant effects. The panel data model can be expressed by
equation (1) as follows:

M it  X it    i  t  it

(1)

where M it is the rate of emigration from country i, in period t. The estimation is carried out
by disaggregating emigration by education level, high, medium and low. Xit is a vector which
includes all independent variables, including corruption and the control variables.  i captures
the country specific effect and t, takes into account the relevant time effect. uit is a random
error term that captures the effect of all omitted variables. Interaction terms are added to the
above specification to investigate desired differential effects.

It can be argued that all explanatory variables used in our empirical model are not strictly
exogenous. An approach that allows controlling for the joint endogeneity of explanatory
variables through the use of internal instruments is the Arellano-Bover (1995) -Blundell Bond
(1998) system GMM estimator. In summary, equation (2), which involves variables in levels,
is combined with equation (3), which involves variables in first differences. Equation (2) is
instrumented by lagged first differences of the variables, whereas equation (3) is
instrumented by lagged variables in levels.

M it   yit 1  X it    i  t  it
M it – M it 1   (M it 1  Mit 2 )   ( X it  X it 1 ) t  (it  it 1 )

(2)
(3)
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The variable definitions are the same as above for equation (1), with lagged values of the
variables now entering the equation. The system GMM estimation is also carried out by
disaggregating emigration by education level. Two diagnostic tests, the Hansen test for overidentifying restrictions under which the null hypothesis is that the instruments are not
correlated with the residuals, and the Arellano-Bond test for second order correlation in the
first differenced residuals are carried out.

As a further test for endogeneity, instrumental variable (IV) estimation could be useful in
addition to the system GMM. In the IV estimation, a good instrument should be correlated to
corruption and not influence public debt through other channels. Among the variables used as
instruments for corruption are: ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Mauro 1995), the settler
mortality data of Acemoglu et al. (2001) (Ahlin and Pang 2008), latitude (Gupta et al. 2002,
Delavallade 2006), the initial level of corruption (Gupta et al. 2002). Following Gupta et al.
(2002), we use the initial level of corruption as an instrument for corruption. A Sargan test
for over-identifying restrictions under which the null hypothesis is that the instruments are
not correlated with the residuals is carried out under the IV estimation.

5. Empirical Results
5.1 Fixed Effects Estimation
The preliminary estimation is carried out using fixed effects estimation to control for time
invariant country effects. Results are reported in Table 2. Column (1)-(3) reports results for
high, middle and low levels of educational attainment respectively, using the TI corruption
index and columns (4)-(6) for the same, using the Kaufmann et al. corruption index. Control
variables are included for per capita income to account for the level of development of the
country, government expenditure on education to GDP as higher levels of government
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expenditure on education can reduce emigration, and the polity index to capture institutions.
All variables except for the polity index have been converted into logarithmic form for the
empirical estimation.

[Table 2, about here]
For emigrants with high levels of educational attainment, columns (1) and (4), only the linear
coefficient on the TI and Kaufmann et al. corruption index is statistically significant. The
quadratic term is not significant. The results suggest that as corruption increases, the
emigration rate of those with high levels of educational attainment increase. In column (1) for
example, the linear coefficient on the TI corruption index suggests that a 1 unit increase in
the corruption index increases the emigration rate by 0.34%. For those with medium and low
levels of educational attainment however, columns (2) and (3) and columns (5) and (6), the
linear terms are positive, and the quadratic terms are negative, suggesting that the emigration
rate of those with medium and low levels of educational attainment increase at low levels of
corruption and then begins to decline beyond a certain point 4. This is observed for both the
TI and Kaufmann et al. corruption indices. Calculated threshold points for those with medium
levels of educational attainment indicate that beyond a threshold point of 3.5 on the TI index
and 3.6 on the Kaufamann et al. index, that emigration begins to decline. Similarly, beyond a
threshold point of 3.6 on the TI index and 3.9 on the Kaufmann et al. index, the emigration of
those with low levels of educational attainment begins to decline. The linear coefficient on
the TI corruption index in column (2) for those with medium levels of educational attainment
suggests that a 1 unit increase in the corruption index initially increases the emigration rate
by 0.20%.
4

The R2 terms in the quadratic models indicated that the explanatory power of the model is increased when the
quadratic term was incorporated into the models. A F test further rejected the hypothesis that the regression was
linear at the 1% and 5% significance levels against the alternative that it was quadratic.
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The results also suggest that the level of development of a country as measured by per capita
income has a significant effect on the emigration rates of all three groups. A higher per capita
income reduces the incentive of those with high educational attainment to emigrate, while it
increases the incentive of those with low and middle levels of educational attainment to
emigrate. This is possibly because it increases the ability of these two groups to emigrate.
The coefficients on government expenditure devoted to education is statistically significant at
the 10% level for the emigration rate of those with medium levels of education and
significant at the 5% and 1% levels in columns (3) and (6) for the emigration rate of those
with low levels of education, indicating that if the government devotes a larger proportion of
GDP to education, it would lead to a fall in the emigration rates of those with medium and
low levels of educational attainment. This perhaps is because these groups stand to gain most
from the government provision of services. The coefficients on the polity index are
statistically significant at the 10% level for emigrants with high and medium levels of
education suggesting that better institutions act as a deterrent to the emigration of these
groups.

5.2 Additional Control Variables

[Table 3, about here]

We re-estimate the model by incorporating more control variables for inequality (the Gini
coefficient), population density and employment (the labour force participation rate). The
results are reported on Table 3. The highest emigration rate is observed for those with high
levels of educational attainment consistent with the results obtained in Table 2. In column (1)
for example, the coefficient on the TI index suggests that a 1 unit increase in the corruption
index leads to an increase of 0.36% in the emigration rate of those with high levels of
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educational attainment. Once again, the coefficient on the quadratic term for this group is not
statistically significant. The estimated linear and quadratic coefficients on the corruption
indices are statistically significant for those with medium and low levels of educational
attainment, suggesting that the emigration rate of those with middle and low levels of
educational attainment increase, and then begins to decline beyond a certain point. Calculated
threshold points suggest that the emigration rate of those with medium levels of educational
attainment decline after corruption reaches a level of 3.7 and 3.4 on the TI and Kaufmann et
al. corruption index respectively and the emigration of those with low levels of educational
attainment decline when corruption reaches a level of 3.4 and 3.6 on the TI and Kaufmann et
al. index respectively. The coefficients on per capita income are positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level for all groups. Government expenditure influences the emigration
rate of those with middle and low levels of educational attainment, while the polity index has
a significant effect on those with high levels of educational attainment. An increase in
inequality as indicated by the Gini coefficient leads statistically significant fall in the
emigration rate of those with middle and low levels of educational attainment, in particular
those with low levels of educational attainment. The coefficient on population density is
statistically significant in all columns with the exception of column (6). The results indicate
that the higher the LFPR, the lower will be the emigration rate of all groups.
[Table 4, about here]

In Table 4 we incorporate an interaction term for the Gini coefficient x corruption, in order
to see if inequality increases the impact of corruption on emigration. We also include wage
and salaried workers as a % of total employed as wages act as a push factor for emigration.
The results suggest that greater inequality does intensify the impact of corruption on
emigration, that is, reduces the ability to emigrate. Similarly, earning a wage reduces the
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incentive for those from all educational groups to emigrate. The linear coefficients on the
main variable of interest, corruption, is statistically significant for all groups and the
quadratic term is statistically significant for those with middle and low levels of educational
attainment as before. The results are in general, qualitatively similar to those obtained above.

5.3 Correcting for Endogeneity
Next the estimation is carried out by using the system GMM and IV methods to address
potential endogeneity concerns. Columns (1)-(3) report results for system GMM estimation
and columns (4)-(6) reports results for IV estimation. Given that the estimation using the TI
index and Kaufmann et al. index yield similar results, we report only results using the TI
index5.
[Table 5, about here]
The GMM estimates indicate once again, a linear relationship between corruption and
emigration rate for the group with high levels of educational attainment, and a quadratic
(inverted U) shaped relationship between corruption and the emigration rate of those with
medium and low levels of educational attainment. High per capita income has a positive
statistically significant effect on the emigration rates of those with middle and low
educational attainment and a negative impact on those with high levels of educational
attainment. The results are in general, broadly consistent with those obtained above. The
Hansen test and the serial correlation test in the system GMM estimation confirm that the
moments conditions cannot be rejected.

5

Results using the Kaufmann et al. index yield qualitatively similar results.
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The correlation between corruption and emigration appears to be robust to the inclusion of a
number of control variables. We need however, to ensure that the direction of causality is
from corruption to emigration. For this, using instrumental variable (IV) estimation could be
useful in addition to fixed effects and system GMM. To serve as a good instrument, the
instrument should be correlated to corruption and not influence emigration through other
channels. Among the variables used as instruments for corruption are: ethnolinguistic
fractionalization (Mauro 1995), the settler mortality data of Acemoglu et al. (2001) (Ahlin
and Pang 2008), latitude (Gupta et al. 2002, Delavallade 2006), the initial level of corruption
(Gupta et al. 2002)6. As the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index could also be correlated
with emigration, and the settler mortality rate and latitude lead to a significant fall in number
of observations, we use the initial level of corruption as an instrument for corruption (see
Gupta et al. 2002) in the IV estimation. The results of the IV estimation are consistent with
those obtained under the fixed effects and system GMM estimation methods. Corruption has
a linear effect on the emigration rate of those with high educational attainment and a nonlinear effect on those with middle and low educational attainment. The general conclusions
broadly remain the same. The Sargan test indicates that the instruments are valid and
uncorrelated with the error term.

5.4 Splitting the Sample
Given the robust evidence in favour of an inverted U-shaped relationship between corruption
and the emigration rate of those with medium and low levels of educational attainment, we
split the sample into two by country and time – those falling below the mean Gini index of 43
6

Triesman (2000) finds that countries with British heritage, Protestant tradition, higher per capita GDP,
uninterrupted democracy, and greater openness to imports rank lower on the corruption index, and those with
Federal states tend to rank higher compared to those with unitary states.
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(low inequality in income distribution) and above the mean Gini index (high inequality in
income distribution), to investigate if the effect of corruption on the emigration rates of these
two groups is conditional on income distribution. Each of these groups is divided into two
groups based upon inequality in income distribution. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 reports
regression results for the influence of corruption on the emigration rate of those with medium
and low levels of educational attainment; and columns (3) and (4) report regression results for
countries with high levels of income inequality. We only report results for the estimation
carried out with the TI index. The estimation using the Kaufmann et al. index yields similar
results.
[Table 6, about here]
The results in columns (1) and (2) indicate that in countries with low levels of income
inequality, the emigration rate of both groups with medium and low levels of education,
increase, and then decreases beyond a certain threshold. Calculated threshold points indicate
that for the group with medium levels of educational attainment, emigration rates begin to fall
after reaching a threshold point of 3.44 and for those with low levels of educational
attainment at a threshold point of 3.73. Per capita income has a statistically significant
positive effect on emigration and increased government expenditure on education reduces
emigration. Increased labour force participation reduces emigration while the coefficient on
population density is statistically significant only in column (1).

Columns (3) and (4) report results for countries with high levels of income inequality. Note
that here only the linear term is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that in the
presence of high income inequality, corruption reduces the ability of those with both medium
and low levels of educational attainment to emigrate.
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6. Conclusions
This paper examines the relationship between corruption and the emigration rate of those
with high, medium and low levels of educational attainment. The results support our three
hypotheses. The empirical results indicate that as corruption increases the emigration rate of
those with high levels of educational attainment also increase. The emigration rate of those
with middle and low levels of educational attainment however, increases at initial levels of
corruption and then decreases beyond a certain point exhibiting an inverted U-shaped pattern.
When we split emigrants with medium and low levels of educational attainment by income
distribution, we find evidence of a fall in the emigration rate of both these groups due to an
increase in income inequality. It is possible that increased inequality generated by corruption
increase liquidity constraints faced by those with middle and low levels of educational
attainment, thus reducing their ability to emigrate beyond a certain point.

Calculated

threshold points are in the range of 3.4 – 3.9 on the TI and Kaufmann et al. index.
Government policy should focus on controlling corruption which in turn would lead to funds
being channelled more productively into education and also lead to a fall in inequality which
would reduce emigration. The control of corruption would also lead to the retention of those
with high levels of educational attainment and lead to better labour market outcomes with
employment based on merit rather than political connections.

19

References
Acemoglu D, Johnson S, Robinson J (2001) The colonial origins of comparative
development: an empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91: 1369-1401.
Ahlin C, Pang J (2008) Are financial development and corruption control substitutes in
promoting growth? Journal of Development Economics 86: 414-433.
Aidt T (2003) Economic analysis of corruption: a survey. Economic Journal 113: 632- 652.
Arellano M, Bover O (1995) Another look at the instrumental variables estimation of error
components models. Journal of Econometrics 68: 29-51.
Ariu A, Squicciarini P (2013) The balance of brains: corruption and high skilled migration.
IRES Discussion Paper 10, Catholic University of Louvain.
Banerjee B (1984) The probability, size and uses of remittances from urban to rural
areas in India. Journal of Development Economics 16: 293-311.
Beine M, Sekkat K (2013) Skilled migration and the transfer of institutional norms. IZA
Journal of Migration: 2-9.
Blundell R, Bond S (1998) Initial conditions and moment restrictions in dynamic panel data
models. Journal of Econometrics 87: 115-143.
Borjas J (1987) Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants. American Economic Review
77: 531-553.
Brücker H, Capuano S, Marfouk A (2013) Education, gender and international migration:
ensights from a panel-dataset 1980-2010, mimeo.
de Haas H (2007) Remittances, migration and social development: a conceptual review of the
literature. Social Policy and Development Programme Paper No 34, United Research Institute
for Social Development, Geneva.
Delavallade C (2006) Corruption and distribution of public spending in developing countries.
Journal of Economics and Finance 30: 222-239.
Dimant E, Krieger T, Meierrieks D (2013) The effect of corruption on migration, 1985-2000.
Applied Economics Letters 20: 1270-1274.
Dincer O, Gunlap B (2012) Corruption and income inequality in the United States.
Contemporary Economic Policy 30: 283-292.
Docquier F, Lodigiani E, Rapoport H, Schiff M (2010) Emigration and the quality of home
country institutions. Discussion Paper No 35, Institut de Recherches Economiques et
Sociales, Université catholique de Louvain.
Dreher A, Kotsogiannis C, McCorriston S (2008) How do institutions affect corruption and
the shadow economy? International Tax and Public Finance 16: 773-796.

20

Gould DJ, Amaro-Reyes JA (1983) The effects of corruption on administrative performance.
Illustrations from developing countries. World Bank Staff Working Papers No. 580, World
Bank, Washington.
Gupta S, Davoodi H, Alonso-Terme R (2002) Does corruption affect income inequality and
poverty? Economics of Governance: 23-45.
Gupta S, Davoodi H, Tiongson E (2000) Corruption and the provision of health care and
education services. IMF Working Paper No. 116, International Monetary Fund, Washington.
Hoddinott J (1994) A model of migration and remittances applied to Western
Kenya. Oxford Economic Papers 46: 459-476.
Kaufmann D, Kraay A, Mastruzzi M (2012) World Governance Indicators Project. World
Bank.
Kaufmann D, Kraay A, Zoido-Lobaton P (1999) Governance matters. World Bank Policy
Research Department Working Paper No. 2196, World Bank, Washington.
Lederman D, Loayza N, Soares R (2005) Accountability and corruption: political institutions
matter. Economics and Politics 17: 1-35.
Lucas R, Stark O (1985) Motivations to remit: evidence from Botswana. Journal of Political
Economy 93: 901-918.
Marshall M, Jaggers K (2013) http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity13.htm#nam.
Accessed December 2013.
Mauro P (1995) Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110: 681–712.
Mauro P (1998) Corruption and the composition of government expenditure. Journal of
Public Economics 69: 263-279.
Mckenzie D, Rapoport H (2007) Network effects and the dynamics of migration and
inequality: theory and evidence from Mexico. Journal of Development Economics 84: 1-24.
Mendez F, Sepulveda F (2006) Corruption, growth and political regimes: cross country
evidence. European Journal of Political Economy 22: 82-98.
Meon P, Weill L (2010) Is corruption an efficient grease? World Development 38: 244-259.
Rosenzweig MR (1988) Risk, implicit contracts and the family in rural areas of low-income
countries. Economic Journal 98: 1148– 1170.
Schneider F, Enste D (2000) Shadow economies: size, causes, and consequences. Journal of
Economic Literature 38: 77–114.
Stark O, Lehvari D (1982) On migration and risk in LDCs. Economic Development and
Cultural Change 3: 191– 196.

21

Transparency International (2013) Corruption Perceptions Index.
http://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results.
Treisman D (2000) The causes of corruption: a cross national study, Journal of Public
Economics 76: 399-457.
Wei S (2001) Corruption in economic transition and development. UNECE Spring Seminar,
Geneva.

22

Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable

Emigration of Low Educational
Attainment
Emigration of Middle Educational
Attainment
Emigration of High Educational
Attainment
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)

Obs

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

460

4.32

9.70

0.02

64.34

460

4.52

7.18

0.04

42.01

460
441

17.44
2068.29

17.66
1974.06

0.14
50.04

84.89
8610.02

419

14.54

6.47

3.86

54.80

448

66.95

10.88

42.40

90.80

460

100.57

156.63

1.48

1160.99

260

49.56

22.96

5.00

93.20

Gini Index

285

43.42

9.00

25.62

62.78

Corruption Index Kaufmann et al.

450

3.05

0.61

0.93

4.42

Corruption Index TI

405

6.90

1.15

2.80

10.00

Government Expenditure on Education
(% GDP)
Labour Force Participation Rate (% of
total population 16-64)
Population Density (people per square
km of land area)
Wage and Salaried Workers (% of total
employed)

Source

Brücker et al.
(2013)
Brücker et al.
(2013)
Brücker et al.
(2013)
WDI
WDI
WDI
WDI
WDI
WDI
Kaufmann et
al. (2012)
Transparency
International
(2013)
Marshall and
Jaggers
(2013)

Polity Index (ranges from -10 (hereditary
monarchy) to +10 (consolidated
democracy)
460
2.99
5.80
-9.00
10.00
Note: Corruption K = Corruption index of Kaufmann et al. has been rescaled so that 0 stands for not corrupt and
+5 for totally corrupt and Corruption TI = Corruption index Transparency International has been reversed so
that 0 stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt.
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Estimation
Dependent Variables: Emigration Rate of those with High, Middle and Low Levels of
Educational Attainment
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Medium
0.201
(0.040)***
-0.029
(0.014)**
-

Low
0.156
(0.112)**
-0.020
(0.008)***
-

High
-

Medium
-

Low
-

-

-

-

Corruption K

High
0.344
(0.166)**
-0.055
(0.040)
-

Corruption K2

-

-

-

Per Capita
Income
Government
Expenditure on
Education
Polity

-0.554
(0.073)***
-0.139
(0.160)

0.330
(0.064)***
-0.117
(0.063)*

0.707
(0.072)***
-0.103
(0.032)**

0283
(0.041)***
-0.132
(0.133)
-0.707
(0.072)***
-0.103
(0.093)

0.232
(0.103)**
-0.032
(0.012)***
0.306
(0.067)***
-0.171
(0.102)*

0.195
(0.085)***
-0.027
(0.012)**
0.617
(0.074)***
-0.173
(0.070)***

R2

-0.020
(0.010)*
0.48

0.031
(0.017)*
0.55

0.011
(0.019)
0.58

0.011
(0.005)*
0.52

-0.025
(0.015)*
0.53

0.014
(0.017)
0.56

Observations

345

345

345

377

377

377

Corruption TI
Corruption TI2

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels.
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Estimation with Additional Control Variables
Dependent Variables: Emigration Rate of those with High, Middle and Low Levels of
Educational Attainment
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Medium
0.212
(0.102)**
-0.029
(0.018)*
-

Low
0.128
(0.019)***
-0.019
(0.008)**
-

High
-

Medium
-

Low
-

-

-

-

Corruption K

High
0.363
(0.074)***
-0.021
(0.040)
-

Corruption K2

-

-

-

Per Capita
Income
Government
Expenditure on
Education
Polity

-0.526
(0.108)***
-0.040
(0.129)

0.364
(0.102)***
-0.029
(0.018)*

0.420
(0.109)***
-0.125
(0.061)**

0.376
(0.105)***
-0.102
(0.113)
-0.502
(0.111)***
-0.045
(0.013)

0.290
(0.060)***
-0.043
(0.023)*
0.308
(0.108)***
-0.120
(0.065)*

0.122
(0.024)***
-0.017
(0.0101)*
0.405
(0.166)***
-0.136
(0.053)***

-0.031
(0.010)*
-0.012
(0.008)
0.513
(0.231)**

-0.020
(0.020)
-0.007
(0.003)**
0.121
(0.055)*

-0.011
(0.021)
-0.013
(0.005)***
0.124
(0.074)*

-0.011
(0.014)*
-0.010
(0.007)
0.604
(0.213)***

-0.018
(0.014)
-0.007
(0.004)*
0.207
(0.120)*

-0.011
(0.012)
-0.015
(0.005)***
0.054
(0.044)

LFPR

-0.180
(0.073)***

-0.254
(0.122)**

-0.217
(0.071)***

-0.190
(0.070)***

-0.481
(0.239)**

-0.201
(0.079)***

R2

0.60

0.67

0.70

0.62

0.68

0.71

Observations

229

229

229

243

243

243

Corruption TI
Corruption TI2

Gini Index
Population
Density

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
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Table 4: Fixed Effects Estimation with More Control Variables and Interaction Terms
Dependent Variables: Emigration Rate of those with High, Middle and Low Levels of
Educational Attainment
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Medium
0.247
(0.062)***
-0.035
(0.023)*
-

Low
0.124
(0.062)**
-0.018
(0.009)**
-

High
-

Medium
-

Low
-

-

-

-

Corruption K

High
0.305
(0.047)**
-0.009
(0.008)
-

Corruption K2

-

-

-

Per Capita
Income
Government
Expenditure on
Education
Polity

-0.334
(0.149)***
-0.049
(0.138)

0.197
(0.065)***
-0.132
(0.082)*

0.673
(0.163)***
-0.148
(0.051)***

0.307
(0.038)***
-0.080
(0.102)
-0.215
(0.081)***
-0.142
(0.113)

0.290
(0.103)***
-0.043
(0.019)**
0.172
(0.070)***
-0.059
(0.029)**

0.108
(0.008)***
-0.014
(0.007)**
0.666
(0.174)***
-0.269
(0.148)*

-0.050
(0.025)**
-0.085
(0.029)***
0.104
(0.027)***
-0.161
(0.034)***

-0.041
(0.015)
-0.050
(0.019)***
0.270
(0.271)
-0.415
(0.157)***

0.003
(0.004)
-0.081
(0.031)***
0.124
(0.074)*
-0.016
(0.009)*

0.023
(0.011)**
-0.063
(0.022)***
0.129
(0.028)***
-0.160
(0.050)***

-0.014
(0.014)
-0.031
(0.014)**
0.255
(0.220)
-0.425
(0.153)***

0.020
(0.022)
-0.052
(0.024)**
0.516
(0.314)*
-0.130
(0.084)*

-0.300
(0.110)***

-0.523
(0.132)***

-0.495
(0.148)***

-0.404
(0.192)**

-0.367
(0.153)***

-0.425
(0.129)***

Gini
Coefficient*
Corruption
R2

-0.022
(0.008)***

-0.015
(0.008)*

-0.026
(0.009)***

-0.015
(0.006)***

-0.009
(0.003)***

-0.016
(0.007)**

0.73

0.72

0.75

0.78

0.73

0.79

Observations

159

159

159

156

156

156

Corruption TI
Corruption TI2

Gini Index
Population
Density
LFPR

Wage
Employment

Note: Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels
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Table 5: System GMM and IV Estimation
Dependent Variables: Emigration Rate of those with High, Middle and Low Levels of
Educational Attainment
(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.003
(0.003)
-0.075
(0.021)***
0.120
(0.056)**
-0.018
(0.009)*

-0.020
(0.010)**
-0.052
(0.022)***
0.120
(0.024)***
-0.154
(0.050)***

-0.017
(0.010)*
-0.030
(0.015)**
0.240
(0.110)**
-0.420
(0.150)***

-0.021
(0.023)
-0.041
(0.020)**
0.452
(0.114)***
-0.126
(0.064)***

-0.020
(0.008)***
0.671
(0.221)***
0.25

-0.024
(0.009)***
0.712
(0.245)
0.19

-0.015
(0.006)***
-

-0.010
(0.004)***
-

-0.018
(0.009)**
-

0.16

0.18

0.21

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.32

0.30

0.27

R2

-

-

-

0.77

0.74

0.70

Observations

165

165

165

243

243

243

Government
Expenditure on
Education
Polity
Gini Coefficient
Population Density
LFPR

Gini Index *
Corruption
Lagged Dependent
Variable
Hansen Test for
Overidentifying
Restrictions: p value
Arellano-Bond Test for
2nd order
autocorrelation: value
Hansen Test for

-0.040
(0.020)*
-0.045
(0.039)
0.110
(0.017)
-0.167
(0.030)***

-0.030
(0.015)**
-0.047
(0.016)***
0.215
(0.121)*
-0.420
(0.147)***

-0.018
(0.007)***
0.665
(0.312)**
0.21

(6)
Low
0.126
(0.103)**
-0.016
(0.009)*
0.520
(0.160)***
-0.230
(0.140)**

Per Capita Income

Low
0.120
(0.042)***
-0.016
(0.005)***
0.520
(0.142)***
-0.132
(0.096)*

(5)

High
0.334
(0.041)***
-0.018
(0.017)
-0.219
(0.080)***
-0.131
(0.123)

Corruption TI2

High
0.316
(0.045)***
-0.010
(0.009)
-0.315
(0.109)***
-0.123
(0.118)

(4)

IV Estimation
Medium
0.210
(0.101)**
-0.030
(0.014)**
0.181
(0.069)***
-0.044
(0.022)**

Corruption TI

System GMM
Medium
0.217
(0.051)***
-0.031
(0.015)**
0.184
(0.045)***
-0.130
(0.061)**

Overidentifying
Restrictions: p value

Note: Standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively.
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Table 6: Splitting the Sample by Income Distribution
Dependent Variable: Emigration rate of those with Medium and Low Levels of Educational
Attainment
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Below Mean Gini Index
(Low Income Inequality)
Medium
Low
0.131
0.112
(0.043)***
(0.016)***
-0.014
-0.015
(0.007)*
(0.007)**
0.126
0.164
(0.050)***
(0.050)***
-0.018
-0.020
(0.010)*
(0.012)**
-0.003
-0.002
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.131
0.119
(0.081)*
(0.155)

Above Mean Gini Index
(High Income Inequality)
Medium
Low
-0.140
-0.118
(0.040)***
(0.040)***
-0.010
-0.121
(0.011)
(0.131)
0.110
0.131
(0.005)***
(0.015)**
-0.015
-0.018
(0.007)*
(0.008)**
-0.002
-0.002
(0.001)*
(0.003)
0.114
0.113
(0.061)*
(0.131)

LFPR

-0.120
(0.027)***

-0.212
(0.102)**

-0.134
(0.032)***

R2

0.78

0.74

Corruption TI
Corruption TI2
Per Capita
Income
Government
Expenditure
Polity
Population
Density

-0.101
(0.071)*

Observations
123
123
219
219
Note: Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. ***, **, *, significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
respectively.

28

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

Figure 1: Emigration Ratio of those with High Levels of Educational Attainment and TI
Corruption Index

0
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Corruption TI Index
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8

Fitted values

Note: The TI corruption index has been reversed so that 0 stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt.
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Figure 2: Emigration Ratio of those with Medium Levels of Educational Attainment
and TI Corruption Index
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Note: The TI corruption index has been reversed so that 0 stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt.
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Figure 3: Emigration Ratio of those with Low Levels of Educational Attainment and TI
Corruption Index
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Note: The TI corruption index has been reversed so that 0 stands for not corrupt and 10 totally corrupt.

